Bloody Borno
An alarming sequence of terror attacks in Borno State raises further questions about the country’s counter-terrorism strategy. The coordinated suicide bombings in Maiduguri on the evening of March 16 represent
- Femi Macaulay
An alarming sequence of terror attacks in Borno State raises further questions about the country’s counter-terrorism strategy.
The coordinated suicide bombings in Maiduguri on the evening of March 16 represent a significant and tragic escalation in the North-East region’s security situation. The attacks occurred as residents were breaking their Ramadan fast, shattering a period of relative calm in the Borno State capital.
Three simultaneous explosions targeted high-traffic areas: the Monday Market (the city’s largest trading hub), the Post Office general area, and the entrance to the University of Maiduguri Teaching Hospital (UMTH). Reports indicate at least 27 people were killed and approximately 146 others injured.
The Nigerian military and local authorities have attributed the strikes to the Aliyu Ngulde-led faction of Boko Haram (JAS), though no group has officially claimed responsibility.
It is disturbing that these synchronised urban attacks may mark a return to high-impact body-borne Improvised Explosive Device (IED) tactics that had been rare in Maiduguri since 2021.
Equally troubling is that the attacks occurred amidst an influx of roughly 3,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) into the city following recent insurgent raids in towns like Pulka and Ngoshe.
The raids in Pulka and Ngoshe during early March stand as some of the most devastating attacks in Gwoza Local Government Area in recent years.
Initial reports confirmed the deaths of several soldiers and prominent community leaders, including the Chief Imam of Ngoshe. Most alarmingly, estimates of abductions range from 100 to over 300 residents, primarily women and children. Following the destruction of Ngoshe, survivors fled to the neighbouring town of Pulka, creating an immediate emergency.
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By March 12, the Nigerian Army’s Northeast Joint Task Force (Operation Hadin Kai) successfully reoccupied Ngoshe after a counter-offensive.
Governor Babagana Zulum visited Pulka on March 22 to oversee the distribution of food and cash palliatives to the thousands of newly displaced families
Senator Ali Ndume, who visited the affected communities alongside Governor Zulum, painted a dire picture when he spoke to journalists in Abuja. The senator representing Borno South Senatorial District warned that Nigeria could lose parts of the North-East to terrorists and called on the Federal Government to “double its efforts in equipping the Army with sophisticated arms and ammunition.”
Ndume said: “I gathered that our soldiers lack adequate ammunition, and they ran away from Ngoshe and Pulka because the terrorists overwhelmed them.
“It was days after reinforcement that they regained the place.”
However, Defence Headquarters was quick to reject this narrative. The Director of Media Operations, Maj. Gen. Michael Onoja, countered the claim, asserting: “There is no basis to conclude that they will overrun the region.”
Was Ndume being alarmist, or was the military downplaying the crisis?
There is weight to the senator’s claim regarding equipment. While the Federal Government has made significant purchases (such as the Super Tucano jets and T-72 tanks), frontline infantry units sometimes struggle with basic supplies, functional armoured personnel carriers (APCs), or sophisticated night-vision gear.
Ndume observed in a statement while sympathising with families of victims of the Ngoshe attack: “The Nigerian Army Budget is insignificant compared to what is in the budget, that’s less than 10 per cent of the budget.”
He advised: “The president should ensure that the Nigerian security agencies budget be frontloaded. Even if we can’t purchase attack helicopters, we should consider hiring to be deployed to black spots areas.”
There is a documented disconnect between “budgeted money” and “boots-on-the-ground hardware.” In the 2026 budget, the National Assembly approved N1.504 trillion for the Army. While this is a massive sum, much of it is swallowed by personnel costs (salaries/welfare) rather than new “sophisticated arms.”
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Across the entire security architecture, the 2026 budget earmarks only N13.12 billion specifically for “arms and ammunition.” This is spread across the Army, Navy, Air Force, Police, and even the Department of State Services (DSS). The Army’s direct share for ammunition remains a fraction of the total budget, supporting Ndume’s claim that the budget for actual “procurement” is “too small” relative to the intensity of the war.
Furthermore, delays in releasing money often mean soldiers wait months for the specific ammunition or spare parts needed for active theatres.
Ndume is correct that there are local shortages and equipment failures during specific battles, which can lead to retreats. However, the military argues these are “temporary tactical withdrawals” rather than a sign that the Army is unarmed.
The escalating frequency of terrorist activity in Nigeria’s North-East this year is deeply troubling.
The month opened with a devastating assault on March 1, when terrorists targeted a Forward Operations Base (FOB) in Mayanti, Bama Local Government Area of Borno State. The raid resulted in the death of the base commander, Major UI Mairiga, alongside three soldiers and a local hunter.
On February 6, four soldiers were killed in a terrorist ambush at Auno near Jakana in Borno State.
On January 30, terrorists attacked the Wajirko community along the Biu-Damboa Road in Borno State, killing five soldiers and 15 civilians.
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On January 28, terrorists overran a military formation in Damasak, killing seven soldiers, including the Commanding Officer, a Major.
The year began with a lethal combination of mine warfare and ambush near Bindundul village in Mobbar Local Government Area of the state. On January 5, nine soldiers were killed and several others injured when their convoy struck a landmine.
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The history of weapons procurement for counter-terrorism in the country is a sobering study of how systemic corruption can directly compromise national security. While recent years (2024–2026) have seen a move toward more transparent “Government-to-Government” (G2G) deals, the legacy of past scandals continues to shape the current “hardware” deficit.
The “history of fraud” is precisely why Ndume’s current warnings must be taken seriously. The memory of “missing arms money” creates a deep scepticism among the public and the rank-and-file soldiers. When Ndume says he “gathered that our soldiers lack adequate ammunition,” the immediate question is: Did the money disappear again, or is it a logistics failure?
The persistent nature of the insurgency, underscored by the recent Maiduguri bombings and the raids in Ngoshe and Pulka, corroborates the consensus among security experts, policymakers, and international partners on the necessity of a ‘Whole-of-Society’ approach.
However, even this multi-dimensional approach demands that the counter-terrorism effort be underpinned by superior warfare capacity.
