Constituency projects and crisis of fiscal responsibility

Under Section 4 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), the legislative powers of the republic are vested in the National Assembly. Lawmakers are empowered to make laws for the peace, order, and good governance of the federation and to exercise oversight over the executive. Nowhere does the constitution assign them the responsibility of executing projects. In contrast, Section 7 recognizes the system of local government by democratically elected councils, while the Fourth Schedule of the Constitution clearly outlines the functions of local governments. These include the construction and maintenance of roads, streets, street lighting, drains, public conveniences, markets, and primary healthcare facilities, among others.

When federal legislators insert boreholes and classroom renovations into the national budget, they encroach into responsibilities constitutionally assigned to local governments. This structural overlap undermines federalism and weakens institutional clarity.

The consequences of this practice are significant. First, it encourages budget padding and political bargaining during appropriation processes. Projects are often frontloaded into the budget under pressure from constituents who now measure legislative performance by visible infrastructure rather than quality law-making. Second, it creates room for diversion of public funds and abandonment of projects. Reports have repeatedly shown that many constituency projects are either poorly executed or left incomplete. Third, it fosters undue political patronage, with allegations that some legislators influence the selection of contractors through Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs).

This situation places lawmakers in an awkward position. Instead of focusing on crafting strong legislation, debating national economic direction, or strengthening oversight functions, they are drawn into the politics of contract facilitation.

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The issue is not whether communities deserve development—they certainly do. The problem lies in institutional misplacement. Legislators can and should advocate for their constituencies. They can lobby the executive to prioritize certain areas. They can debate motions highlighting urgent needs. But directly embedding localized projects in the federal budget distorts the separation of powers.

The capital component of the national budget should focus on high-impact, cross-cutting projects that benefit all Nigerians. Federal road construction, for example, should prioritize highways linking states and boosting interstate commerce. In agriculture, the emphasis should be on mechanized farming, irrigation systems, and national food security infrastructure. In health and education, priority should go to tertiary institutions and specialized facilities that serve the broader population. These are clearly federal responsibilities.

With the renewed push for local government autonomy, it is even more imperative to return grassroots development to local councils. Allocations meant for constituency projects should instead be ploughed back into MDAs for strategic federal priorities. At the same time, local governments should receive and manage their constitutionally guaranteed allocations directly, empowering them to execute community-level projects efficiently and sustainably. When local councils own and implement such projects, continuity is more likely, and accountability is clearer.

When legislators return fully to law-making and oversight, and local governments assume responsibility for grassroots development as envisioned in the constitution, the country will not only save resources—it will build stronger institutions. And in governance, strong institutions matter far more than scattered boreholes.

•Victor Emejuiwe, Abuja.