Reconciling security imperatives with constitutional democracy

Section 24 (Cyberstalking / Offensive Messages)

This section criminalises:

• Sending messages that are “grossly offensive”

• Messages causing “annoyance” or “inconvenience”

• Messages deemed false for the purpose of “causing annoyance”

The problems here are constitutional and practical:

• Terms like “annoyance” and “inconvenience” are vague. Despite the 2024 amendments, this section still contains ambiguous terms which are prone to abuse and could be the reason the section is still being exploited to harass and intimidate citizens. Such ambiguity includes the use of terms like “false information”, “detrimental to national security”, and “likely to cause public disorder”. Such terms are still open to subjective interpretation and abuse by law enforcement.This leaves the definition of what constitutes annoyance and inconvenience to law enforcers who could ascribe it to any word or action until the courts speak to that provision.

• Public officials have invoked the provision against journalists and critics. In December 2025, the State Security Service (SSS) filed cyberstalking charges against Omoyele Sowore. At present, the social media personality, JustAdetoun, is also being charged on this provision for cyberstalking.

• Law enforcement often treats defamation — a civil matter — as a criminal cyber offence. An example is the case against Dele Farotimi who was even charged for criminal defamation despite the fact that defamation as a crime has been expunged from the 2025 amendment of the Act.

Courts have increasingly pushed back, but enforcement culture still reflects overreach. The result is a chilling effect. Journalists now self-censor; Citizens now hesitate to speak;  Whistleblowers now withdraw; and democracy now quietly suffers. Mr.Kunle Edun, SAN was once reported to to have posited thus: “Sadly, most of these cases are never concluded because government officials or rich men allegedly defamed or cyber-stalked, never come to court to testify. This is abuse of power and the courts must never encourage it. “The weaponization of the Cybercrimes Act by investigating and prosecuting agencies is only meant to decimate dissenting voices.

“Charges of cyber-stalking and cyber-bulling are often filed to intimidate critics of government, politically exposed persons and businessmen, which is contrary to the letters and spirit of Section 39 of the Constitution, which provides that every Nigerian shall have a right to freedom of expression, including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference.

Security laws must protect citizens — not protect office holders from criticism. In a constitutional democracy: Criticism of government is not a cybercrime neither should embarrassment be criminalized or considered as a threat to national security. Investigative journalism is not cyberstalking. It is important to draw these fine lines otherwise the cybercrimes legal jurisprudence would continue to be subject of abuse. If cybercrime law becomes a shield for political insulation, we invert constitutional order.

The Security Argument: A Necessary Counterbalance

It must be stated clearly that online harm is real. This paper does not by any means undermine that position. We are dealing with such realities as: Terrorist propaganda networks; Coordinated disinformation campaigns; Ethno-religious incitement; Financial cybercrime syndicates; Deepfake technology etc. Security agencies are not imagining threats. They are confronting them daily. So the propriety of the Cybercrimes Act is not contested. The challenge is precision. A blunt legal instrument destroys both criminality and liberty. A precise instrument creates clarity and trust in the administration of criminal justice while preserving liberty. The future of Nigeria’s digital democracy depends on precision.

International Standards and Comparative Practice

Globally, democracies are refining their cyber regulation frameworks. Key trends include:

• Narrow drafting of speech-related offences

• Clear intent requirements (mens rea thresholds)

• Judicial oversight before content takedown

• Civil remedies over criminal sanctions for defamation

• Independent oversight of surveillance powers

The African Commission’s Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression (2019)  specifically cautions against vague cybercrime provisions used to suppress dissent. Principle 22  explicitly calls on states to review all criminal restrictions on content to ensure they serve a legitimate interest in a democratic society, and specifically mandates that states repeal laws that criminalise sedition, insult, and publication of false news. In Principle 9  which deals with Justifiable Limitations the Declaration demands that any law limiting freedom of expression must be clear, precise, accessible, and foreseeable. This directly acts as a safeguard against the “vague” and over-broad cybercrime provisions often used to target dissenters, journalists, and activists. As a member of the African Union and a state party to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ratified in 1983), Nigeria is obligated to uphold the standards interpreted by the Commission.

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Reform-Oriented and Constitutionally Grounded Solutions

Permit me to propose concrete reforms:

Clarify and Narrow Section 24

• The lawmakers should endeavour to improve on the Act by removing vague terms such as “annoyance” and “inconvenience” or at least define the terms in such a way that uphold democratic ethos.

• Introduce clear intent to cause credible harm

• Require proof of actual harm, not speculative discomfort

• Exclude criticism of public officials unless it constitutes incitement to violence

Establish Prosecutorial Guidelines

Another plausible option is for the Attorney-General to issue binding prosecutorial guidelines limiting use of cybercrime provisions in speech-related matters. Law enforcement must distinguish between  Criminal threats Defamation (which by all intents and purposes should remain in the parlance of civil claims) and Legitimate criticism

Strengthen Oversight of Surveillance

Another thing that can be done is to strengthen and simplify the process of parliamentary oversight of digital interception powers. Security agencies should be held to periodic (advisedly, annual) transparency reports. Security thrives under accountability not secrecy without limits.

Capacity Building for Law Enforcement

Many overreach cases arise from poor understanding of digital rights, lack of cyber-forensic training and institutional culture of criminalising criticism.

It is therefore recommended that CSOs should continue to call for targeted training on constitutional limits and digital evidence management. The government is hereby called upon to implement same as a matter of urgency.

8. The Media’s Responsibility

Another important aspect to look at is Media freedom. While media freedom is not contested, it must be stated that it comes with attendant responsibility. Journalists and digital publishers must endeavour to:

• Verify information

• Avoid sensationalism

• Guard against misinformation

• Develop internal compliance systems

Freedom without responsibility weakens the case for freedom, but a professional media ecosystem strengthens constitutional defence against repression.

Corporate Platforms and Digital Governance

Social media companies operating in Nigeria also play a role. We need:

• Clear localised compliance frameworks

• Transparent content moderation standards

• Data protection enforcement alignment with the Nigeria Data Protection Act

That said, I must caution that this is not a basis for digital authoritarianism in the name of  digital governance.

Conclusion: Reframing the Debate:

Finally, it is important for all stakeholders to understand that security and freedom are not adversaries. They are interdependent and intertwined. Without security, civic space collapses into chaos. Without liberty, security becomes coercion. A democratic state must balance both through clarity of law; proportionality in enforcement of same; ensuring judicial independence and establishment of mechanisms that ensure institutional accountability

Nigeria now stands at a digital crossroads. We can choose to use cybercrime law to fortify democracy, or continue to allow it to remain an instrument of fear and silence. The choice of the former requires constitutional courage. Legislators must be courageous enough to interrogate such laws and do the needful. Law enforcement must learn to exercise restraint, the civil society must engage constructively and the media must act responsibly. All hands must be on deck and we all must contribute our path to ensure Nigeria moves in the right direction.