Rethinking reintegration strategy for repentant insurgents

Reintegration, therefore, is not a concession. It is a strategic necessity. Programmes such as Operation Safe Corridor were designed to manage this reality, focusing on low-risk, repentant individuals while preserving judicial pathways for high-risk offenders. But as the scale of disengagement has grown, so too have the pressures on the system designed to absorb it.

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The intelligence and reintegration gap

Nigeria is not short of policy intent. What remains uneven is the coherence of implementation across its DDR architecture. Multiple initiatives—military-led, prison-based, and community-level—operate simultaneously, often with different standards, mandates, and oversight structures. Recent moves by the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) to promote a more people-centred approach reflect growing recognition of this gap.

The expansion of Operation Safe Corridor into the Northwest, including the establishment of a regional hub in Zamfara State, further underscores the urgency of building a unified national framework. What was once a Northeast-focused intervention is now becoming a nationwide policy challenge. Without coherence, scale risks outpacing strategy.

Nigeria has encountered this gap before, often at moments where progress appeared most tangible. In July 2022, the Kuje Correctional Centre was breached in a coordinated assault claimed by Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). More than 800 inmates were freed, including dozens of high-risk insurgent affiliates.

The scale and precision of the attack pointed not to a sudden lapse, but to systemic vulnerabilities including limited perimeter defence, delayed response coordination, and insufficient anticipation of evolving threat tactics. The incident effectively reversed years of detention and prosecution gains in a single night.

Beyond high-profile attacks, similar patterns emerge at the community level. In parts of Borno State, reintegration efforts have been met with visible resistance. Local protests in communities such as Konduga and Bama have reflected fears over the return of former fighters without parallel guarantees of security, justice, or victim support. In some cases, community leaders have demanded clearer screening processes and stronger assurances before accepting reintegrated individuals.

These developments are not isolated disruptions. They reveal a consistent pattern where systems do not fully integrate security, justice, and community trust, gains remain reversible. Reintegration may be administratively complete, but without social anchoring, it remains strategically fragile.

The missing centre: Community legitimacy

At the core of Nigeria’s DDR challenge is not just capacity, but legitimacy. Reintegration programmes have often focused on ex-combatants without sufficiently integrating the perspectives of the communities receiving them. This creates an imbalance; individuals are processed, but environments are not fully prepared.

The result is predictable. Communities become cautious. Trust erodes. Reintegration, while technically complete, remains socially fragile. This is why the shift towards a more people-centred DDR approach is significant. It acknowledges that security outcomes are not produced by programmes alone, but by the relationships they sustain.

Victims and the politics of fairness

No issue illustrates this tension more clearly than the perceived imbalance between support for ex-combatants and support for victims. For many Nigerians, the concern is: why should those who perpetrated violence receive structured reintegration packages while victims struggle for recognition and assistance?

This is not simply a moral objection. It is a question of legitimacy. Yet reintegration itself is not a reward; it is a preventive tool aimed at reducing future violence. Without viable exit pathways, insurgent groups retain manpower and operational continuity. The policy challenge, therefore, is not to choose between victims and ex-combatants, but to design a system that visibly addresses both. Where victims are neglected, reintegration loses credibility. Where reintegration is absent, conflict persists.

One of the most under-acknowledged factors in DDR outcomes is economic inclusion. Emerging reports suggest that limited funding and weak livelihood support are among the reasons some ex-combatants struggle to remain disengaged. Reintegration without economic absorption creates vulnerability not only for individuals, but for the system as a whole.

Framed differently, economic reintegration is not a social programme; it is a security investment. Without it, the cost of disengagement rises, and the risk of return whether driven by necessity or pressure increases.

Nigeria’s DDR programmes are not failing for lack of effort. They are constrained by fragmentation. Different regions, agencies, and programmes operate with varying degrees of coordination. The expansion into the Northwest, the NCTC’s evolving role, and the Office of the National Security Adviser’s efforts to harmonise approaches all point to a system in transition.

What is needed now is consolidation: a unified national DDR framework; clearer institutional coordination; embedded community participation; and consistent communication that explains not just what is being done, but why. The contrast between convictions and reintegration is not, in itself, a failure. It is a reflection of the dual nature of modern counterinsurgency—one that requires both justice and disengagement.

Nigeria’s DDR programmes will not be judged solely by how many insurgents surrender, nor by how many are prosecuted, but by whether the system that connects these pathways is coherent, trusted, and sustainable. Nigeria’s DDR will succeed not when insurgents surrender, but when communities accept their return.

•Olayiwola is a peace & conflict researcher/policy analyst. He can be reached at lekanolayiwola@gmail.com