The Almajiri system: Islamic education model or radicalisation factory in Nigeria?
In the dusty streets of many cities in northern Nigeria, a familiar spectacle has become an eyesore: young children between the ages of 4 and 12 begin their daily ritual
- By Mufutau Muyiwa
In the dusty streets of many cities in northern Nigeria, a familiar spectacle has become an eyesore: young children between the ages of 4 and 12 begin their daily ritual of begging for alms. For many residents, the loud voices of these children have become an anticipated disruption to the quiet, alluring gaze of the early morning sunlight.
The children move in groups from house to house, from car to car, and from the mosque to the market, displaying tin and plastic bowls and singing melodiously in unison to their trademark ‘‘yar bakara’’ (begging lyrics), while dancing with choreographed perfection. These are children of the Almajiri system, notorious for begging, harassing bystanders or pedestrians for alms, and scrambling over food remnants at restaurants and ceremonies. The Almajiri system has become entrenched in northern Nigeria as a model for inculcating Islamic education under the tutelage of a religious teacher.
It was anchored on the premise that vibrant community support can serve as a social lifeline for children's welfare and education. Today, the system has become a catchphrase for child displacement, street begging, economic deprivation, social neglect, and systemic exclusion. Its ideological foundations create structural conditions for radicalisation and conceal vulnerabilities that terrorist groups exploit. This disrupts social approaches to addressing terrorism, with negative implications for national security.
The Almajiri system did not ignite terrorism, but it remains a mechanism that ensures an abundant supply of foot soldiers for Boko Haram and other splinter groups like ISWAP (Islamic State West Africa Province). In its current form, the system incubates a large pool of out-of-school children, estimated at 7 to 10 million. These Almajiri children constitute low-hanging fruit for the recruitment drives of terrorist groups in northern Nigeria.
Empirical research on insurgency in Nigeria buttresses the assertion that marginalised groups like the Almajiri population seek alternative identities, material security, and social inclusion. This makes them vulnerable to religious extremism and ideological indoctrination, particularly in fragile contexts where state institutions fail to provide basic services to the population. Therefore, the Almajiri debacle is a smokescreen for a broader education and governance crisis in northern Nigeria.
Many countries have grappled with the problems associated with traditional Islamic boarding schools, like Nigeria's Almajiri system. However, evidence suggests that Islamic education can coexist with formal schooling, thereby allowing children to receive both religious and secular education. For instance, Indonesia operates a system of traditional Islamic boarding schools called ‘‘pesantren’’. In 2019, the government of President Joko Widodo empowered the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) to implement a framework that effectively integrated Islamic schools into the national education system.
Similarly, Malaysia has regulated and transformed its traditional ‘‘madrasah’’ system into a framework that blends secular and religious education. In the aftermath of the Casablanca bombings in 2003, Morocco implemented a wave of reforms to its ‘‘msids’’ system, creating a dual education structure where traditional Islamic schools operate alongside a modern, comprehensive, and secular education system. One distinct feature of the basic education system in these countries is the harmonisation of Islamic religious teachings with modern pedagogical techniques and secular curricula.
President Goodluck Jonathan made vigorous efforts to blend Islamic education with secular formal education in 2012. This was part of a national framework to develop and integrate Almajiri education into the country’s Universal Basic Education under his administration.
The reforms faced widespread social and political resistance in the north, and many of the integrated model schools with boarding facilities were abandoned, following the end of his tenure in 2015. The Almajiri conundrum is hidden in plain sight, having escaped the attention of successive administrations. A virtuous system supported by communities has been transformed into a failed socio-economic, cultural, and religious experiment in northern Nigeria. Many Qur’anic schools exist outside official accreditation and regulatory oversight. Economic deprivation, social neglect, and material insecurity create fertile ground for religious and ideological extremism. The social approaches to counterterrorism efforts must recognise and neutralise the exploitative use of the Almajiri population as a recruitment node for criminal networks and terrorist organisations.
The Almajiri system is an emotionally charged and highly politicised topic in northern Nigeria. Developing and administering a comprehensive, coordinated, and sustained response will require shared responsibility and accountability across federal, state, and local levels of governance. Policy reforms should enforce educational dualism, integrate vocational programs to economically empower students, and provide regular training opportunities for teachers in both secular and Qur’anic schools.
By combining accredited Islamic and secular education, the Almajiri system can be effectively integrated into the formal education sector. However, reforms must appeal to the socio-cultural sensitivities and religious sentiments that have allowed the problem to persist. Community sensitisation programs should target parents, Muslim scholars, and traditional leaders, emphasising the Islamic justifications for child welfare and the socio-economic benefits of bridging religious and secular education.
The Almajiri system can leverage formal education to equip children for modern life without compromising traditional religious values. Beyond educational duality and curriculum reforms, the Almajiri population needs social welfare support and government-sponsored school feeding programs to eliminate reliance on informal survival methods. In this case, these children would not need to leave rural communities, be separated from their families, or beg on the streets to access both Islamic and formal education.
Nigeria’s resolve to end the insurgency in northern Nigeria will be partly tested by its capacity to address the cycles of extreme poverty and systemic exclusion that are synonymous with the Almajiri population. A sacred education system designed to advance Islamic scholarship should not institutionalise street exploitation or become a show of national shame.
Mufutau Muyiwa is an Associate Lecturer and PhD Candidate in media and political communication at the University of Erfurt, Germany. He can be reached on LinkedIn or via email at mufutau.muyiwa@uni-erfurt.de
