Why Tinubu will win again in 2027
President Bola Tinubu’s prospects in 2027, Barrister Emmanuel Umohinyang contends, will rest on a dual advantage: a reform-driven record the administration can point to and an opposition he considers fragmented
President Bola Tinubu’s prospects in 2027, Barrister Emmanuel Umohinyang contends, will rest on a dual advantage: a reform-driven record the administration can point to and an opposition he considers fragmented and directionless. Between measurable achievements and the absence of a compelling alternative, he believes the electoral terrain already tilts in Tinubu’s favour, reports Associate Editor ADEKUNLE YUSUF.
Barrister Emmanuel Umohinyang does not speak like a man hedging his bets. Calm but emphatic, the legal practitioner and public affairs advocate believes President Bola Ahmed Tinubu has already laid the groundwork for a second mandate. In his view, the political debate around 2027 may be loud, but the direction of the country under the current administration is already shaping voter perception.
Umohinyang, convener of the Re-elect Buhari Movement (RBM) and President of the Centre for Leadership and Justice, is no stranger to political advocacy. A protégé of the late Chief Gani Fawehinmi, he has long framed his activism around governance, institutional reform and accountability. Though he is known for supporting successive APC administrations, he insists his position is grounded in policy outcomes rather than party loyalty alone. According to him, “Elections are ultimately referendums on performance. Nigerians may disagree loudly, but when they step into the polling booth, they weigh who took difficult decisions and who merely talked.”
Reforms that reshaped the economic landscape
Central to Umohinyang’s argument is the administration’s economic reform agenda, which he describes as “painful but foundational.” He points first to the removal of the long-standing petrol subsidy — a move previous governments avoided for decades. “That single decision,” he says, “ended a system that was bleeding the treasury and enriching a few. It was not politically convenient, but it was economically inevitable.”
The unification of foreign exchange rates followed soon after, another reform that triggered initial turbulence but, in his view, restored transparency and investor confidence. Multiple exchange windows, he argues, had encouraged speculation and distortions that weakened the naira and eroded trust in the financial system. “These were structural distortions,” he notes. “You cannot build a modern economy on artificial rates and unsustainable subsidies. What the President did was to confront reality.”
He points to revenue performance as evidence that the strategy is yielding results. By late 2025, non-oil revenue collections had reportedly crossed N20 trillion — a record figure driven by improved tax administration and digital monitoring systems. “For the first time in years,” Umohinyang says, “Nigeria is talking seriously about funding its budget without leaning almost entirely on oil. That is a shift from dependency to diversification.”
Debt sustainability is another area he highlights. The debt service-to-revenue ratio, once hovering near crisis levels, has reportedly fallen below 50 percent. He interprets this as a sign that fiscal space is gradually returning. “When nearly all your revenue goes to servicing debt, governance becomes firefighting. Bringing that ratio down gives the government breathing room to invest in development,” he explains.
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He also cites the rebound in foreign reserves, which climbed above $42 billion by late 2025, as a sign of renewed macroeconomic stability. Combined with tighter monetary coordination, he believes the economy is transitioning from shock to stabilization. “Recovery does not happen overnight,” he adds. “But the fundamentals are shifting. And voters, especially business owners and workers, feel these shifts gradually.”
Another major focus of Umohinyang’s optimism is the tax reform framework, which he describes as a redistributive shift designed to ease the burden on the poor. “The tax reform act is meant to change the narrative,” he explained. “The rich must pay more so the government can take care of the poor. Anything that benefits the poor will always face resistance from those who are comfortable with the old system.” He dismissed claims that the reform process lacked consultation. “There were engagements across sectors, including civil society,” he said. “Some of the noise you hear now is political, not factual.”
Infrastructure as a visible marker of governance
Beyond macroeconomic indicators, Umohinyang emphasises infrastructure as a tangible symbol of governance continuity. He describes ongoing projects as “evidence that reform is translating into physical transformation.” Among these, the Lagos-Calabar Coastal Highway stands out as a flagship project. He argues that such large-scale transport corridors are not merely roadworks but economic arteries designed to unlock trade, tourism, and regional integration. “Infrastructure is not about concrete alone,” he says. “It is about productivity. When goods move faster and cheaper, the entire economy benefits.”
He also points to the Sokoto-Badagry Highway and the Kano-Katsina-Maradi rail line as examples of attempts to rebalance development across regions. “For decades, we complained about uneven infrastructure,” he remarks. “Now there is a deliberate effort to link the north, south, and border economies.” In the energy sector, he notes improvements in crude oil output, which has risen toward 1.6 million barrels per day, alongside renewed attention to domestic refining. To him, this signals progress toward reducing fuel import dependence. “Energy security is economic security,” he says. “You cannot industrialize while importing refined products indefinitely.”
Housing is another area he mentions, referencing new affordable housing schemes intended to stimulate construction jobs while addressing urban shortages. “These are projects people can see,” he stresses. “Elections are influenced not only by statistics but by visible signs that a government is building.”
Social investment and the politics of inclusion
While critics often frame reforms as harsh, Umohinyang argues that social interventions have been designed to cushion vulnerable groups. He describes the Nigerian Education Loan Fund (NELFUND) as a transformative step for access to higher education. “For years, brilliant students dropped out because of fees,” he says. “A structured loan system opens doors that were previously closed.” He also references the N330 billion social investment programme aimed at supporting low-income households. Though implementation challenges remain, he believes the framework reflects an acknowledgment that reform must be accompanied by protection for the poor. “No reform is socially sustainable if the weakest are abandoned,” he notes. “The administration understands that.”
The signing of a new national minimum wage of N70,000 is another measure he highlights, describing it as a signal that labour concerns are being addressed alongside fiscal restructuring. “You cannot ask workers to endure reforms without adjusting wages,” he says. “It shows a balance between discipline and compassion.”
Agriculture, security and grassroots governance
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Turning to agriculture, Umohinyang underscores mechanisation drives and support for farmers as part of efforts to tackle food inflation and rural poverty. Tractor distribution schemes and input support programmes, he argues, are intended to modernize smallholder farming. “If we produce more locally, prices stabilize,” he explains. “Food security is inseparable from national security.”
On the security front, he acknowledges persistent threats but maintains that institutional strengthening is underway. Investments in surveillance technology, border management, and inter-agency coordination are, in his words, “long-term capacity measures rather than quick fixes.” “Insecurity did not start yesterday,” he says. “But improving intelligence systems and equipment lays the groundwork for lasting gains.”
He also welcomes moves toward greater local government autonomy, which he believes could improve grassroots accountability and service delivery. “Development must reach the ward and community level,” he argues. “Stronger local governance structures bring government closer to the people.”
Opposition politics and the crisis of alternatives
For Umohinyang, the political implications of these policies are clear. He argues that incumbents who undertake difficult structural reforms often face early backlash but later gain recognition once stability begins to return. “History shows that reformers are criticized first and appreciated later,” he says. “By 2027, many of today’s shocks will have settled into normalcy.” He also points to the absence of a unified opposition platform as a factor that may favor the incumbent. But he insists performance remains the decisive variable. “Opposition strength matters, but governance record matters more,” he explains. “If citizens see improvement in infrastructure, education access, and economic stability, that weighs heavily.” Ultimately, he frames the next election as a choice between continuity of reform and a return to what he calls “short-term populism.”
“Nigerians understand sacrifice when they see direction,” he concludes. “The reforms are not cosmetic. They are structural. And that, in my view, is why President Tinubu stands in a strong position heading toward 2027.” Whether voters will ultimately share that assessment remains to be seen. But voices like Umohinyang’s reflect a strand of public opinion that sees the administration’s turbulence as the price of long-term correction — and believes that, when the ballots are cast, that narrative could prove decisive.
If Umohinyang adopts a measured tone in assessing the nation’s economic direction, he is markedly more unsparing when the conversation turns to the condition of opposition politics. In his view, democracy does not thrive on criticism alone; it depends on the presence of coherent, disciplined, and credible alternatives. That, he suggests, is where the present system is faltering. “Opposition should not just be about attacking the government,” he said. “It should be about offering alternatives. When the government does well, you acknowledge it. When it does not do well, you show Nigerians what you would have done differently.”
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For Umohinyang, the essence of democratic competition lies in intellectual seriousness and policy depth. He argues that what currently passes for opposition engagement is often animated less by governance philosophy than by a desire to see the administration stumble. “What we have now,” he observed, “is a situation where some opposition figures seem to be praying that the government gets it wrong, so they can feast on the failure politically. That does not help the country. Democracy should not be a waiting room for collapse.”
He rejects suggestions that the ruling party bears responsibility for the visible fragmentation among rival platforms. To him, the inability of opposition parties to present a unified front reflects internal weaknesses rather than external sabotage. “If there is no strong opposition today, you cannot blame the ruling party for that,” he argued. “Before you can present yourself as an alternative government, you must first be able to organize your own house. Nigerians are watching. They want to see structure, discipline, and clarity of purpose.”
He points to persistent leadership tussles, factional disputes, and procedural breakdowns within opposition parties as evidence of systemic dysfunction. “When parties are fighting among themselves and cannot even hold a proper meeting, what do you expect the ruling party to do?” he asked pointedly. “You cannot empower your opponent. No political party anywhere in the world goes out to organize the opposition for them. Politics is competitive by nature.”
On recurring allegations that the administration is engineering defections through inducements, Umohinyang is openly skeptical, insisting that such claims are rarely supported by verifiable evidence. “Talk is cheap,” he said. “Where is the proof that someone was given contracts or money to join the ruling party? These are mere statements without evidence. Politics is dynamic. People move based on conviction, calculation, or survival — that is not new.”
He argues that political migration is often a reflection of shifting assessments about performance and prospects rather than coercion. “If a politician believes the president is doing well and the law permits him to cross over, what stops him?” he asked. “In the past, people have also left the ruling party for the opposition. Did anyone say the opposition lured them with money? We must be consistent in our logic.”
Umohinyang is equally dismissive of claims that anti-corruption institutions are being deployed as partisan tools. He insists that law enforcement processes should not be reflexively politicized. “You cannot mix the job of the EFCC with politics,” he said. “Members of the ruling party have also been arrested and prosecuted. So you cannot say it is only opposition figures being targeted. If someone has a case to answer, the courts are there.”
Ultimately, he returns to what he considers the central challenge: institutional rebuilding within the opposition space. “The opposition must first put itself together,” he concluded. “You cannot come to Nigerians asking for power when you cannot even manage your own internal affairs. Democracy deserves competition, yes — but it must be competition between organized, responsible, and visionary platforms.”
