Should fear of abuse stop state police?
Are fears that state police could be misused by governors sufficient grounds to abandon the idea altogether? Can a highly centralised policing structure truly serve a complex federation like Nigeria?
Are fears that state police could be misused by governors sufficient grounds to abandon the idea altogether? Can a highly centralised policing structure truly serve a complex federation like Nigeria? And how have other federal systems organised their law enforcement to balance accountability with local control? Deputy News Editor JOSEPH JIBUEZE examines the arguments, interrogates the anxieties, and explores comparative models from across the world.
Nigeria’s security challenges have reached a point where the idea of state police is no longer a fringe theory.
It is now at the centre of national debate, with President Bola Ahmed Tinubu himself leading the advocacy.
“What I promised you will not be postponed. We will establish state police to combat insecurity,” the President told governors last Monday.
For decades, the country has relied on a centralised police, controlled federally from Abuja.
But rising insecurity, from banditry and kidnapping to cultism and communal clashes, has led many lawyers, legal scholars, public officials and security advocates to argue that centralised policing is no longer sufficient for the realities of a diverse and federated Nigeria.
At the same time, critics worry that giving state governors control over police forces could create new abuses of power, politicise law enforcement, and even undermine national unity.
Opponents argue that if the existing federal police are better funded and equipped, there will be no need for state police.
But proponents of state police argue that decentralised policing is a logical response to structural weaknesses in Nigeria’s current security system.
One of the most prominent voices in the debate is Prof. Itse Sagay (SAN), a senior legal scholar and former Chairman of the Presidential Advisory Committee on Anti-Corruption.
Sagay has publicly stated that state police would be more effective in tackling Nigeria’s “escalating insecurity”.
He noted that the federal force often reacts too slowly to local threats, such as banditry and murder.
He argued that a localised policing framework would “allow for quicker and more efficient security responses” because it brings law enforcement closer to the communities affected.
Sagay acknowledged the potential for abuse but emphasised that civil society and the judiciary can act as checks against misuse.
Similarly, Lawal Pedro (SAN), the Attorney-General and Commissioner for Justice of Lagos State, expressed strong legal support for state policing.
Pedro observed that many crimes are localised in nature.
The current federal structure, in his view, leaves the police overstretched and incapable of adequately responding across all states.
He pointed out that Nigeria historically operated regional and local police formations during the First Republic, suggesting that decentralised policing is not alien to Nigerian legal history.
Both Sagay and Pedro argue that state police would enable faster intelligence gathering, community policing, and contextual responsiveness, elements that are currently missing or weak within the centralised system.
Constitutional imperatives
State police cannot be created by executive fiat; it requires a constitutional amendment.
This is because the Nigeria Police Force is established under the current Constitution, and policing is listed on the Exclusive Legislative List, meaning only the Federal Government can legislate on it.
Changing this requires moving policing either to the Concurrent Legislative List or creating new constitutional provisions for dual policing systems.
President Tinubu has repeatedly called on the National Assembly to amend the Constitution to enable state policing, while emphasising that safeguards must be built into the legal reform process to prevent abuse by state governors.
Will decentralisation improve security outcomes?
Proponents of state police argue that local threats require local responses since many crimes occur within distinct cultural, linguistic and geographic contexts.
A police force rooted in a specific state may understand local dynamics far better than a central force headquartered in Abuja, they say.
Advocates like Sagay emphasise that delayed responses from the federal force often allow criminals to evade capture, a problem that state forces could mitigate.
Local police forces could be more accountable to the communities they serve, building trust and cooperation that federal officers, seen as outsiders by some communities, sometimes lack.
Nigeria has experimented with regional and local policing structures before, indicating that decentralised policing is not unprecedented in the country’s legal development.
Lawyers also argue that decentralised policing could free up federal resources to focus on nationwide threats such as terrorism, interstate crimes and organised criminal networks, while state forces handle local security issues.
Are concerns about abuse valid?
One of the strongest counterarguments comes from voices worried about the potential abuse of power by state governors.
Immediate-past Inspector-General of Police Kayode Egbetokun had argued that Nigeria may not be “ripe” for state police.
He believes that governors could use these forces for political or personal gain, especially in a highly polarised environment.
This fear is echoed by critics who point to the elite’s history of using security forces as tools against critics and opponents.
Opponents also argue that multiple police forces could complicate command structures, create jurisdictional conflicts, and even exacerbate ethnic tensions if loyalty shifts towards state interests rather than national cohesion.
However, some legal scholars concede that any policing system, whether federal or state, carries risks of abuse.
Afterall, the federal police itself has been used in politically motivated ways, underscoring the fact that centralisation alone does not guarantee neutrality.
Governors have been accused of deploying the police against their foes and critics.
On numerous occasions, police have arrested citizens, flown them to Abuja, and charged or detained them under the notorious Cybercrimes Act for social media posts or comments criticising governors, which ought to have been treated under civil defamation laws.
So, proponents of state police argue that the presence of abuse does not necessarily justify rejecting the idea, and that existing legal protections can be deployed to check arbitrary actions.
Legal giants back call
Former Body of Benchers Chairman Chief Wole Olanipekun (SAN) believes the current centralised policing structure is antithetical to federalism.
Delivering the 40th convocation lecture of the Olabisi Onabanjo University, Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State, he said: “How do we have a Federal Government with federating states where the governors do not have any jurisdiction or power over the security systems or apparati in their state; yet a governor is casually labelled as the Chief Security Officer of his state!
“He does not appoint the Commissioner of Police in his state. All he hears is the deployment of a Commissioner of Police to his state. He has no say, even in the deployment.
“We should stop deceiving ourselves by sending police commissioners from any state in the North to the Southwest or the Southeast or vice versa when such police commissioners have never been to such places before or have any idea or knowledge of the language or dialect of the people.”
He called for restructuring and devolution of more powers to the states.
A leading litigator, Dr. Wahab Shittu (SAN), said federalism without state policing is a contradiction in terms.
“State policing will ensure effective and efficient policing in that law enforcement agents will easily identify, by the geography of the environment, the hideout and identities of criminals.
“By way of analogy, drafting personnel from Anambra to police Zamfara, an unfamiliar environment, is a disaster.
“Such persons are unfamiliar with the language, culture and criminal antecedents of the area.
“On the contrary, state police implies indigenes of every state can effectively police the area because they know the terrain.”
A lawyer and former Director General of the Bureau of Public Service Reforms, Dr Joe Abah, believes fear of abuse should not be a basis for jettisoning state police.
He stated in a post on X: “When we mostly agree that something is not working (like unitary policing), we should not be afraid to try something new (like state police) for fear of abuse, particularly as the current system is similarly being abused. Instead, let’s think of how to constrain any future abuse.”
A former NBA Vice President, Monday Ubani, stressed that most governors are already heavily part-funding the police, yet they are not subject to their command and control.
To prevent abuse, he said, there can be elaborate provisions in the law.
He said the enabling law must provide that the arrangement is optional, as there may be states that want to remain under the central policing system.
Ubani said the law must also provide that only states that want state police and have the capacity should be allowed to create one.
He also said what constitutes an abuse of state police by any governor’s agent should be properly spelt out.
According to Ubani, one of the measures that can be taken is that when a governor oversteps his bounds in the use of the state police, the Federal police should be called in immediately to intervene and override the autocratic powers of the governor.
Other safeguards
Ubani also recommended the inclusion of structural checks in the Constitution.
He suggested a clear demarcation of jurisdiction between federal crimes (terrorism, interstate crimes, corruption) and state/local crimes (kidnapping, banditry, community disputes).
Written standards for recruitment, discipline, promotion, and oversight to maintain professionalism and prevent politicisation are also necessary.
Legal analysts propose the creation of State Police Service Commissions to oversee recruitment, appointments and discipline, separate from executive interference.
Governors could recommend police leadership, but appointments should require legislative approval, a mechanism that promotes checks and balances.
Sagay and other lawyers emphasise that civil society, media scrutiny and judicial review serve as essential checks on abuse.
Misuse of state police can be challenged in courts, and public exposure of wrongdoing can act as a deterrent.
Some legal commentators argue that not all states may be ready simultaneously for fully independent police forces.
Pilot programmes in willing and capable states could be trialled first, with lessons learned applied to the nationwide rollout.
This phased approach would reduce risks and allow time for legal frameworks and institutional capacity to mature.
How other federations manage decentralised policing
Nigeria is not alone in grappling with how to structure policing within a federal system.
Many federations operate multi-tiered policing arrangements that balance local autonomy with national cohesion.
In the United States, policing is highly decentralised. There are more than 18,000 law enforcement agencies, including municipal police departments, county sheriffs’ offices, state police or highway patrol, and federal agencies such as the FBI, each operating within constitutionally defined boundaries.
State governors do not exercise unchecked control over law enforcement.
Instead, police chiefs in cities are often appointed by mayors and confirmed by councils. Sheriffs are frequently elected. State police are subject to legislative oversight. Federal courts strictly enforce constitutional rights.
The U.S. experience shows that decentralised policing can coexist with strong constitutional protections.
Misconduct does occur, but judicial review, media scrutiny and civil rights litigation provide checks.
For Nigerian lawyers advocating reform, the U.S. demonstrates that federalism and multiple police layers can enhance responsiveness while maintaining national unity.
Canada
In Canada, policing operates at three levels: Federal policing through the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), provincial police in provinces like Ontario and Quebec, and municipal police forces.
Provinces may establish their own police services or contract the RCMP to provide policing.
Crucially, Canada balances decentralisation with national training standards, accountability frameworks and civilian oversight boards.
Police conduct is subject to independent investigative bodies.
For Nigeria, Canada offers a model of cooperative federalism where provincial autonomy coexists with shared standards and intergovernmental coordination.
Germany
In Germany, policing is largely the responsibility of the Länder (states).
Each state maintains its own police force.
However, the Federal Criminal Police Office handles national security, terrorism and interstate crime.
Constitutional protections under Germany’s Basic Law strictly limit abuse.
Strong judicial independence ensures enforcement of rights.
Germany’s experience is often cited by constitutional scholars to show that decentralised policing does not inherently threaten national stability when embedded in a strong constitutional framework.
India
In India, policing is primarily a state responsibility under the Constitution.
Each Indian state maintains its own police force, while federal agencies handle national security and inter-state crimes.
India’s model demonstrates both strengths and challenges.
While local responsiveness has improved, political interference has occasionally been reported.
In response, the Indian Supreme Court has issued directives mandating police reforms, including fixed tenures for police chiefs and independent complaints authorities.
Nigerian reform advocates often cite India as an example of why constitutional safeguards and judicial enforcement are essential.
Lessons for Nigeria
Virtually every major federation operates decentralised policing. Nigeria’s strictly centralised model is more the exception than the norm.
The real question is not whether policing is federal or state-based, but how accountability mechanisms are structured.
Independent police service commissions and civilian complaint boards can be put in place to reduce executive overreach.
As Ubani pointed out, federal agencies should retain control over terrorism, arms trafficking, cybercrime and interstate crimes, while states handle local policing.
Legal experts emphasise that reform must include clear funding mechanisms, transparent recruitment standards, merit-based promotions and human rights training.
Some lawyers suggest phased implementation, beginning with pilot states that demonstrate financial and institutional capacity.
Lawyers argue that fear should inform institutional design, not paralyse reform.
They believe that with judicial independence, legislative oversight, civil society monitoring and media scrutiny, the potential drawbacks can be addressed.
